Report | Israeli Elections, 2026
Explore Check Point research on cyber threats surrounding the 2026 Israeli elections, including DDoS attacks, hacktivist activity, data leaks and emerging risks.

C H E C K P O I N T · E X P O S U R E M A N A G E M E N T RESEARCH REPORT
I S R A E L I E L E C T I O N S 2 0 2 6
They AreThey Are Looking Looking for You.for You. Research report on election-related cyber threats against Israel. Data as of 22 October 2026, five days before election day
UPDATED 22 October 2026
ELECTION DAY 27 October 2026
AUTHORS Haim Bukra · Naomi Atias
TABLE OF CONTENTS
What is inside.What is inside.
01 Key findings for citation Six numbers, three quotable lines and one bottom line
03
02 Scope, data and method Sources, evidence grades and limits
04
03 The threat landscape in numbers Incident volumes, types and actors, 12 months
05
04 Who is behind the activity Incidents by camp: Iran-aligned, hacktivist, criminal and others
06
05 Election-linked activity, 4 to 22 October Timeline of observed events and why each is related
07
06 The Handala campaign Countdown, cadence and amplification
08
07 Evidence plates Primary item content from Check Point monitoring
09
08 Claims versus verification What is proven, what is only claimed
12
09 Telegram and dark web trends Weekly and daily activity charts
13
10 Execution versus preparation indicators Rising and falling indicators, with hypothesis
14
11 National response and forecast check Shield of the Elections and what was seen
15
12 State interests and actor types Who may care about the vote and why
16
13 Forecast and scenarios Likelihood, impact and confidence
17
14 Threat actor landscape Five actor types
18
15 Attack methods and timeline Techniques and the three windows
19
16 Analysis and risk assessment Intent, capability and sector exposure
20
17 Recommendations, methodology and indicators What to do and how the numbers were built
21
Research question
What cyber activity is tied to the IsraeliWhat cyber activity is tied to the Israeli election period, and how strong is theelection period, and how strong is the evidence?evidence?
C H E C K P O I N T · E X P O S U R E M A N A G E M E N T Contents ELECTIONS 2026 · 27.10
Check Point Exposure Management · Confidential · All rights reserved 2026 02 / 23
KEY FINDINGS FOR CITATION
Six numbers, with what each one meansSix numbers, with what each one means Every figure is shown with its source and its limits.
B O T T O M L I N E
The election threat is mainly psychological and influence-driven. Claims outnumber verified compromises, and several recent "leaks" recycle older data.
8787 cyber incidents targeting Israel, 1 to 22 October, 66% of them DDoS Why it is related: DDoS dominates the baseline, as the forecast expects for election day. The pace is not a spike (see page 5).
SOURCE: CHECK POINT CTI REPOSITORY
33 new breach claims in nine days (15 to 22 October), none independently verified Why it is related: Handala announced a 13-night leak countdown on 14 October and the claims follow that cadence. One of the three is unattributed in the repository.
SOURCE: CHECK POINT CTI REPOSITORY AND INTELLIGENCE DATABASE
6.5M6.5M voter records from a 2020 leak are being re-promoted and re-sold on a hacking forum (4 and 16 October) Why it is related: Voter data is a ready-made election narrative. Nothing in the posts shows new data.
SOURCE: CHECK POINT FORUM MONITORING
11 explicit DDoS order, with time, IP address and ports, against the campaign site of the Yashar party (16 October) Why it is related: It is an attack order aimed at a party website two days after the countdown began. No outage was confirmed.
SOURCE: CHECK POINT TELEGRAM MONITORING
−54%−54% #OpIsrael activity on Telegram since 21 September (Telegram items only) Why it is related: Visible hacktivist chatter is falling while preparation indicators rise. This may reflect holding capability for the vote, but it is a hypothesis.
SOURCE: CHECK POINT INTELLIGENCE DATABASE
+79%+79% customer-credential exposures per day at 8 Israeli organizations, September versus April and May Why it is related: Stolen credentials are the entry point for account takeover and phishing. The rise is not proven to be election-driven.
SOURCE: AGGREGATED ALERT TELEMETRY
Q U O T E - R E A D Y
Claims are outpacing proof: three breach claims in nine days, and an earlier "leak" of 38,000 soldiers and police officers was recycled 2025 data.
Q U O T E - R E A D Y
Two of every three cyber incidents recorded against Israel this month are DDoS attacks.
C H E C K P O I N T · E X P O S U R E M A N A G E M E N T Key findings for citation ELECTIONS 2026 · 27.10
Check Point Exposure Management · Confidential · All rights reserved 2026 03 / 23
SCOPE, DATA AND METHOD
What was examined and how far it can beWhat was examined and how far it can be trustedtrusted The report asks which cyber activity relates to the Israeli election period (4 to 22 October 2026), how it is changing, and how strong the evidence is for each item.
SOURCE CONTENT VOLUME GRADE
Check Point election monitor
Election-related mentions on Telegram and the dark web, plus brand alerts for the Central Elections Committee
431 alerts, 4 to 22 October. In a sample of 660 items about 92% came from Israeli news channels
A, B
Check Point CTI repository
Incidents tagged country = Israel (OpenCTI), including claimed attacks
87 incidents 1 to 22 October, monthly series for 13 months
B, C
Check Point intelligence database
Telegram channels, forums and paste sites, searched for specific items
Items cited by ID in the evidence plates A
Aggregated alert telemetry
Alert counts at 8 Israeli organizations in finance, insurance, the public sector, industry and retail
Normalized per day against 13 April to 14 May A
Leaked-credentials database
Leak events that include credentials of 12 government domains
19.0 per day baseline, 24.3 in September A
Evidence grades Status labels used in the report
VERIFIED confirmed by an official source
OBSERVED item seen, claim not tested
CLAIM claim relayed, access not shown
RECYCLED older data presented as new
Limits and exclusions
B O T T O M L I N E
Direct evidence is limited to a handful of items. Most of the picture rests on claims, which is why every item carries a status label.
A. Primary item or direct measurement seen in Check
Point systems.
B. Item relayed by an intermediary channel. The original post was not available.
C. Reported claim without primary evidence.
D. Historical context.
Counts reflect reported and claimed attacks, not verified impact.
Handala's own channel is not ingested, so its posts are known through relays in other channels.
About nine in ten election-monitor items are news coverage, so that count measures public attention, not threat activity.
Material from other security vendors and election events abroad was not used.
C H E C K P O I N T · E X P O S U R E M A N A G E M E N T Scope, data and method ELECTIONS 2026 · 27.10
Check Point Exposure Management · Confidential · All rights reserved 2026 04 / 23
THE THREAT LANDSCAPE IN NUMBERS
Incident volumes, types and actorsIncident volumes, types and actors Incidents tagged to Israel in the Check Point CTI repository. They are reported and claimed attacks.
Cyber incidents targeting Israel, by month OCT PACE 3.95 PER DAY
482
361
241
120
0
178
Oct 25
84
Nov
84
Dec
57
Jan
89
Feb
430
Mar
113
Apr
103
May
74
Jun
71
Jul
128
Aug
98
Sep
87
Oct*
*October covers 1 to 22 October, with the dashed outline showing the full-month pace (about 119). March 2026 (430) was the Iran-US conflict peak. Per day, October (3.95) is 21% above September (3.27) and in line with August (4.13).
By type, 1 to 22 October
87 incidents
57 DDoS (66%)
21 Defacement (24%)
7 Breach (8%)
2 Ransomware (2%)
Most active actors, 1 to 22 October
Yemen Cyber Group 34
Trenggalek Cyber Army 13
Cyber Squad 313 11
Team1914_official 6
coupdegrace 3
chinafans 2
Cyber Team Indonesia 2
WHY THIS IS RELATED TO THE ELECTIONS
The volumes are not election-specific. They show the environment in which election activity happens: two-thirds of incidents are DDoS and one-quarter are defacements, the two techniques the forecast expects against party, government and results sites. Over 12 months the most active groups were Conquerors Electronic Army (187 DDoS incidents), DieNet (97), Black Ember
(90), RipperSec (75), Yemen Cyber Group (68) and NoName057(16) (62).
B O T T O M L I N E
October is busy but not abnormal. The risk is a coordinated DDoS wave on a symbolic date, not a new level of baseline activity.
C H E C K P O I N T · E X P O S U R E M A N A G E M E N T The threat landscape in numbers ELECTIONS 2026 · 27.10
Check Point Exposure Management · Confidential · All rights reserved 2026 05 / 23
WHO IS BEHIND THE ACTIVITY
Incidents by camp: Iran-aligned, hacktivist,Incidents by camp: Iran-aligned, hacktivist, criminal and otherscriminal and others Check Point CTI repository, 1 to 22 October 2026. Camp assignment is an analyst assessment based on actor profiles.
Incidents against Israel by camp, 1 to 22 October (87 incidents)
46 16 9 8 8
Pro-Palestinian and resistance-axis hacktivists: 46 (53%)
Indonesian hacktivists: 16 (18%)
Criminal actors: 9 (10%)
Other DDoS crews: 8 (9%)
Opportunistic defacers: 8 (9%)
Camp assignment is an analyst assessment based on actor profiles in the Check Point CTI repository. No incidents were tagged to state-linked personas or pro-Russian groups in this window.
CAMP GROUPS SEEN IN OCTOBER INCIDENTS TYPICAL ACTIVITY WHY IT RELATES TO THE ELECTIONS
Pro-Palestinian and resistance- axis hacktivists
Yemen Cyber Group (34), Cyber Squad 313, which presents itself as Islamic Cyber Resistance in Iraq (11), Qaher (1)
46 (53%) DDoS against public sites
Symbolic dates draw coordinated DDoS. One group accounts for 39% of all incidents. The Iraq-based group is Iran-aligned (assessment).
Indonesian hacktivists
Trenggalek Cyber Army (13), Cyber Team Indonesia (2), Z-BL4CX-H4T.ID (1)
16 (18%) Defacement and DDoS
Opportunistic. They join the themes of the day, with low impact.
Criminal actors Qilin and The Gentlemen (ransomware), Blacknet00, bibimarket, Mr_Raccoonn, jundalnabi, Sumud Cyber Command (2), plus one unattributed breach
9 (10%) Ransomware, data theft and sale
They use the news cycle to sell data or extort. Not election-specific.
Other DDoS crews
Team1914_official (6), QX-CYBER (1), CyberTroll Team Main (1)
8 (9%) DDoS Ideology not established in the repository. Targets include government and media sites.
Opportunistic defacers
coupdegrace (3), chinafans (2), Nolep7, ZhacNocha, mr.anderson (1 each)
8 (9%) Defacement of small Israeli sites
Low impact, may carry political messages.
Iran state-linked personas (Handala family)
Handala. Copycats Cyber_Handala and handalah_fans were seen in August and September
0 tagged Hack-and-leak, doxxing, intimidation
The only camp with explicit election messaging. The repository logs incidents, not claims, so Handala's claims are not counted here.
Pro-Russian hacktivists
NoName057(16) 0 (62 in 12 months)
DDoS No Russian-attributed election activity is confirmed in the sources reviewed.
B O T T O M L I N E
Hacktivists are the volume: about eight in ten incidents come from them. The actor with explicit election intent, Handala, appears in the claims, not in the incident counts.
C H E C K P O I N T · E X P O S U R E M A N A G E M E N T Who is behind the activity ELECTIONS 2026 · 27.10
Check Point Exposure Management · Confidential · All rights reserved 2026 06 / 23
ELECTION-LINKED ACTIVITY
4 to 22 October, with the reason each item is4 to 22 October, with the reason each item is relatedrelated
B O T T O M L I N E
Nothing yet shows an election-linked outage. What is visible is intent, target lists and claims, most of them unverified.
4 Oct Voter-registry database thread bumped on a hacking forum RECYCLED
A 2020 voter leak is back in circulation as election day nears.
5 Oct TikTok account using the Central Elections Committee's name and logo OBSERVED
Impersonating the body that runs the vote.
9 Oct List of ten government sites, including the Knesset, posted on Telegram OBSERVED
The kind of list that precedes DDoS waves.
9 Oct Contact details of senior officials of a national legislature listed on a doxxing site OBSERVED
Exposure of officials ahead of the vote.
14 Oct Handala announces a 13-night countdown to the elections OBSERVED
Explicit election intent from an Iran-linked actor.
15 Oct Handala claims a former foreign minister's phone; contacts published CLAIM
First leak claim under the countdown.
15 Oct Channel posts contact details and credentials of public figures CLAIM
May be compiled from older leaks.
16 Oct DDoS order against the campaign site of the Yashar party OBSERVED
Attack order against a party website.
16 Oct Forum user says they paid for the voter database link RECYCLED
Recycled data being sold again.
18 Oct Claim on an IDF media-monitoring unit device; mostly old or public data RECYCLED
Cadence of claims, little new content.
18 Oct National Cyber Directorate and Elections Committee announce "Shield of the Elections" OFFICIAL
Official defensive response.
21 Oct Criminal channel claims "Mossad maps" and thanks Handala for collaboration CLAIM
Criminal and state-linked ecosystems converge.
22 Oct Claim of breach of an Israeli payment-systems supplier, relayed as Handala's CLAIM
Same campaign window, supply-chain angle.
C H E C K P O I N T · E X P O S U R E M A N A G E M E N T Election-linked activity ELECTIONS 2026 · 27.10
Check Point Exposure Management · Confidential · All rights reserved 2026 07 / 23
THE HANDALA CAMPAIGN
A countdown, a cadence and an echoA countdown, a cadence and an echo Handala announced on 14 October a 13-night leak campaign. Nine nights later the pattern is visible.
Night 9 of 13
1
14.10
2
15.10
3
16.10
4
17.10
5
18.10
6
19.10
7
20.10
8
21.10
9
22.10
10
23.10
11
24.10
12
25.10
13
26.10
Claims since the countdown
14 Oct 15 Oct 16 Oct 17 Oct 18 Oct 19 Oct 20 Oct 21 Oct 22 Oct
Countdown
Former minister claim
IDF unit claim
Supplier claim
Dark circles are claims relayed without proof. The white circle is the announced intent. The 18 October claim is unattributed in the repository. Handala's own channel is not ingested, so these are known through relays.
What the announcement says
1 Intent with a deadline. The post says the real election begins with Handala in the shadows and that no Israeli official will sleep soundly from that moment.
2 "Networks" widens the target set. Officials, networks and secrets are named as the subject of coming leaks, which signals a claim of access to organizational infrastructure, whether or not real.
3 External outlets add reach. The post says material will be released only through two third-party disclosure outlets, consistent with the loss of some of the group's own sites in 2026.
The echo, 14 October
09:36
Persian channel (Quds-linked)
14:43
Arabic channel
The same announcement appeared in two languages within five hours.
WHO IS HANDALA A persona that surfaced in late 2023 and has claimed leaks and destructive attacks against organizations in Israel, Albania and the United States. It is operated by Void Manticore, an actor that Check Point Research links to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security. Karma and Homeland Justice are sister personas.
B O T T O M L I N E
Three claims in nine days, none verified. The cadence is the signal: the group intends to keep the election in the headlines until 27 October.
C H E C K P O I N T · E X P O S U R E M A N A G E M E N T The Handala campaign ELECTIONS 2026 · 27.10
Check Point Exposure Management · Confidential · All rights reserved 2026 08 / 23
EVIDENCE PLATES I
Attack orders and target listsAttack orders and target lists Plates reproduce the content of Check Point monitoring items, with the original text and its context.
TELEGRAM · CHANNEL OF H4C 16 OCT 2026 · 13:56 UTC · ITEM 53DCAD44
DDoS order against a political party site
ORDER TIME: 15:30 UTC DATE: 16.OCTOBER.2026
Eliminate: yasharwitheisenkot.com
IP: 138.68.74.28 Port: 80 | 443 | 8080 | 54 | 22 | 9443 | 17
ISP: DigitalOcean, LLC ASN: 14061
"Enough Is Enough, Open Your Eyes! This Is Genocide Not Self Defence."
#FreePalestine #ForJustice
Translation / note: The attached image is an election-themed propaganda poster titled "Israel's Election" (a masked figure, a ballot box, the Knesset and the Palestinian flag).
Why related: the target is the campaign site of a leading party, the order names a time, an address and ports, and the attached poster is election-themed. No outage was confirmed.
IMAGE ATTACHED TO THE ORDER
TELEGRAM · HACKTIVIST CHANNEL 9 OCT 2026 · 05:00 UTC · ITEM 0A627BEE
List of ten government websites
1. Prime Minister's Office 2. Knesset 3. Ministry of Foreign Affairs
4. Ministry of Defense 5. IDF 6. Ministry of Finance
7. Bank of Israel 8. Ministry of Justice (and two more)
Translation / note: Ten official sites, one per line, with no message and no deadline.
Why related: DDoS waves are usually announced in advance on Telegram. This list names the institutions that run and report the election. It is a precursor, not an attack.
From list to outage: what has been seen
STEP 1 · 9 OCT Target list of ten government sites OBSERVED
➜
STEP 2 · 16 OCT Attack order against a party site OBSERVED
➜
STEP 3 Confirmed outage of an election-related site
NOT OBSERVED
B O T T O M L I N E
Two items show preparation to disrupt public election-related websites. Neither shows a successful attack.
C H E C K P O I N T · E X P O S U R E M A N A G E M E N T Evidence plates I ELECTIONS 2026 · 27.10
Check Point Exposure Management · Confidential · All rights reserved 2026 09 / 23
EVIDENCE PLATES II
Voter data and an electoral-body imitationVoter data and an electoral-body imitation HACKING FORUM · THREAD "ISRAELI ELECTION VOTERS 2020 DATABASE LEAKED" 14 JUN, 4 OCT, 16 OCT 2026 · ITEMS 366D871B, 70B6F37C, F06DA05A
Voter database thread resurfaces
14 Jun 2026 (cold_runner71): "Thx, will mirror"
4 Oct 2026 (DFGHJ): quotes the original post of 28 Jun 2024 and the description of the February 2020 leak: personal
data of every voter in Israel, about 6.5 million records
16 Oct 2026 (malhojjg6): "where is the link i paid"
Translation / note: The thread dates from June 2024 and the data from February 2020. The October replies bump it back to the top.
Why related: voter data is the classic election leak. Three replies in four months, the latest after payment, show the material is circulating again. Nothing shows new data.
Life of a voter database
Feb 2020
Original leak 6.5M records
Jun 2024
Forum thread posted
14 Jun 2026
Reply: "will mirror"
4 Oct 2026
Bumped with the 2020 summary
16 Oct 2026
Reply: "I paid" for the link
TIKTOK · ACCOUNT @ELECTIONKNESSET 5 OCT 2026 · ALERT SEVERITY HIGH · STATUS OPEN
Account imitating the Central Elections Committee
Display name: Central Elections Committee for the Knesset (in Hebrew)
Followers: 3,084 Following: 0
Logo match with the Committee's profile image: 0.996
Translation / note: Detected by Check Point brand monitoring for the Committee. The account has not been confirmed as unofficial. The profile image is not reproduced.
Why related: an account using the electoral body's name and logo can publish false results or instructions. It is the impersonation scenario in the forecast, observed in practice.
B O T T O M L I N E
Two direct election items: recycled voter data being resold, and a high-severity account imitating the body that runs the vote.
C H E C K P O I N T · E X P O S U R E M A N A G E M E N T Evidence plates II ELECTIONS 2026 · 27.10
Check Point Exposure Management · Confidential · All rights reserved 2026 10 / 23
EVIDENCE PLATES III
Relays and convergence around the HandalaRelays and convergence around the Handala campaigncampaign
THE ANNOUNCEMENT ITSELF: HANDALA POSTER, 14 OCT 2026
TELEGRAM · ARABIC CHANNEL 14 OCT 2026 · 14:43 UTC · ITEM 8C35070B
Handala countdown relayed in Arabic
أعلنت مجموعة »حنظلة« الهكرية عن تكثيف نشاطها مع اقتراب موعد الانتخابات الإسرائيلية
Translation / note: The Handala hacking group announced it is intensifying its activity as the Israeli election date approaches.
Why related: explicit election framing, repeated in Persian (09:36) the same day.
TELEGRAM · ARABIC CHANNEL 22 OCT 2026 · 09:51 UTC · ITEM 30CA9DBB
Claimed breach of an Israeli payment-systems supplier (name withheld)
]name withheld[ حنظلة تكشف معلومات مالية تخص مليوني إسرائيلي — عبر اختراقها شركة
Translation / note: Handala reveals financial information on two million Israelis by breaching a supplier of point-of-sale systems. The company name is withheld.
Why related: same campaign window and the same channels that relayed the countdown. Indirect link, claim only.
TELEGRAM · "INTERNATIONAL GLOBAL NETWORK (SLSH)" 21 OCT 2026 · 23:07 UTC · ITEMS 6240376D, 6832B0A0
Criminal channel claims "Mossad maps" and thanks Handala
we send yu maps that you will not find anywhere else in the world. These maps were leaked from the Mossad Israel ...
The secret places of the Iron Dome ... total database: 4.2 TB ... We thank Handala for collaborating with us
Attached: a 23 MB PDF named as an environmental impact assessment for a power-station expansion, and sample.json
(238 KB)
Why related: shows a financially motivated channel aligning itself with the state-linked campaign in election week. The only sample looks like a planning file, so the claim looks inflated.
B O T T O M L I N E
The campaign is reaching beyond Handala's own channel, but the proof offered so far is thin.
C H E C K P O I N T · E X P O S U R E M A N A G E M E N T Evidence plates III ELECTIONS 2026 · 27.10
Check Point Exposure Management · Confidential · All rights reserved 2026 11 / 23
CLAIMS VERSUS VERIFICATION
What is proven and what is only claimedWhat is proven and what is only claimed Each item is graded by what the evidence shows and by how it relates to the elections.
ITEM WHAT WAS SEEN STATUS LINK WHY IT MATTERS
Handala countdown and nightly leaks
Relays in 2 languages OBSERVED Direct Explicit election framing.
Former foreign minister's phone Claim; archive circulates 3 days later
CLAIM Direct Leak under the countdown. Content not verified.
Politicians' contacts and credentials
Channel post CLAIM Direct May be compiled from older leaks.
IDF media-monitoring unit data Claim; mostly old or public data RECYCLED Indirect Shows cadence, little new content.
38,000 soldiers and police officers
Shown to be 2025 data RECYCLED Indirect Recycling on a symbolic date.
Payment-systems supplier breach
Claim; company silent CLAIM Indirect Same campaign window; supply- chain risk.
"Mossad maps", 4.2 TB Claim; sample looks like a planning file
CLAIM Indirect Criminal and state-linked convergence.
2020 voter database for sale Thread from 2024, bumped; payment reply
RECYCLED Direct Old data, new attention.
DDoS order against a party site Order text; no outage seen OBSERVED Direct Attack preparation.
Account imitating the Elections Committee
Name and logo match; open OBSERVED Direct Impersonation of the electoral body.
0 of 100 of 10 items independently verified as a compromise of an election- related or parliamentary system.
3 of 103 of 10 items shown to be recycled or mostly old data.
B O T T O M L I N E
Intent is clear and public. Capability is not demonstrated. The responsible reading is to prepare for the effect of publication, not to treat each claim as a confirmed breach.
C H E C K P O I N T · E X P O S U R E M A N A G E M E N T Claims versus verification ELECTIONS 2026 · 27.10
Check Point Exposure Management · Confidential · All rights reserved 2026 12 / 23
TELEGRAM AND DARK WEB TRENDS
Hacktivist chatter is falling; election talk isHacktivist chatter is falling; election talk is risingrising
#OpIsrael mentions on Telegram, by week DOWN 54% SINCE 21 SEPTEMBER
2417
1812
1208
604
0
Tishrei holidays
1,379
Aug 24
1,304
Aug 31
2,048
Sep 7
1,821
Sep 14
836
Sep 21
953
Sep 28
902
Oct 5
858
Oct 12
Peak average: 1,935 a week Since 21 September: 887 a week Telegram items only. The decline persists after the holidays, so the holidays do not fully explain it.
Election-related mentions by day, election monitor 365 IN 17 DAYS
37
28
19
9
0
15
4
20
5
23
6
24
7
30
8
16
9
12
10
21
11
31
12
28
13
29
14
31
15
22
16
11
17
28
18
21
19
3
20
October average: 21.5 a day June: 6.5 a day 4 to 20 October (20 October partial). About 92% of items in a 660-item sample came from Israeli news channels, so the 3.3-fold rise measures public attention to the elections, not hostile activity.
B O T T O M L I N E
Public attention to the elections is up 3.3 times. Visible hacktivist activity on Telegram is down 54%. The first is the news cycle, the second is the signal to watch.
C H E C K P O I N T · E X P O S U R E M A N A G E M E N T Telegram and dark web trends ELECTIONS 2026 · 27.10
Check Point Exposure Management · Confidential · All rights reserved 2026 13 / 23
EXECUTION VERSUS PREPARATION INDICATORS
What is rising, what is falling, and why it isWhat is rising, what is falling, and why it is relatedrelated Change per day across 8 Israeli organizations, versus 13 April to 14 May.
Change per day, by indicator
← Decrease Increase →
Customer credentials +79%
+69%
Phishing sites +62%
−8%
Lookalike domains +42%
+35%
Employee credentials −52%
−60%
High-severity alerts −18%
−23%
Total alerts −4%
−1%
September 1 to 21 October
Why each indicator is related Customer credentials: Stolen logins feed account takeover and phishing, the techniques used against officials and official accounts.
Phishing and lookalike domains: Election-themed lures and brand imitation cluster around votes.
Employee credentials and high-severity alerts: Fewer detected intrusions at the organizations measured.
#OpIsrael on Telegram: The visible hacktivist layer.
Hypothesis: the calm before the storm?
When preparation indicators rise and execution indicators fall,
one possibility is that attackers are building access and waiting
for the moment of greatest impact.
This is an analyst hypothesis. Alternatives include the Tishrei
holidays, the size of the sample and detection settings.
B O T T O M L I N E
Credential exposure and phishing are up, detected intrusions are down. The data does not prove a link to the elections.
C H E C K P O I N T · E X P O S U R E M A N A G E M E N T Execution versus preparation ELECTIONS 2026 · 27.10
Check Point Exposure Management · Confidential · All rights reserved 2026 14 / 23
NATIONAL RESPONSE AND FORECAST CHECK
The official answer, and the forecast againstThe official answer, and the forecast against what was seenwhat was seen
SHIELD OF THE ELECTIONS
On 18 October the National Cyber Directorate and the Central Elections Committee announced a joint operation against disruption, impersonation, phishing and takeover attempts on election systems. Voting in Israel is on paper, so the operation protects the digital layer around it. The public is asked to close any defaced site and to report it to the national cyber line, 119.
Forecast against what was seen
FORECAST LIKELIHOOD WHAT WE HAVE SEEN SO FAR
Leaks about officials High A claim against a former foreign minister (15 Oct) and a politician-credentials post (15 Oct). None verified.
DDoS on public websites
High A target list (9 Oct) and a DDoS order against a party site (16 Oct). No election-linked DDoS wave confirmed in the sources reviewed.
Account impersonation Medium A TikTok account using the Elections Committee's name and logo (5 Oct), open for validation.
False or manipulated content
Medium No confirmed case in the sources reviewed.
Destructive attack Low No related claim. The March 2026 Handala record remains the reference.
Left out, and why Read with care
Groups recycle older data around symbolic dates. The material
is public. The proof is not.
B O T T O M L I N E
The first forecast signals have appeared: leak claims and attack preparation. A confirmed election-day outage has not.
Foreign election events and reports by other vendors.
Incident counts without an election link, except where they explain the baseline.
Client-specific alert details.
C H E C K P O I N T · E X P O S U R E M A N A G E M E N T National response and forecast check ELECTIONS 2026 · 27.10
Check Point Exposure Management · Confidential · All rights reserved 2026 15 / 23
STATE INTERESTS AND ACTOR TYPES
Who may care about the vote, and what hasWho may care about the vote, and what has been seenbeen seen Interest is not capability. Attribution reflects public reporting and Check Point Research, and is an assessment.
COUNTRY INTEREST ASSOCIATED GROUPS SEEN IN THIS PERIOD LIKELIHOOD
Iran Political and psychological pressure, and a chance to show reach on a symbolic date.
Void Manticore, which runs the Handala, Karma and Homeland Justice personas (hack-and-leak, wipers), and Scarred Manticore (espionage and access). Both are tracked by Check Point Research and linked to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security.
Handala countdown and three leak claims, 14 to 22 October.
High
Russia Shaping public opinion, deepening divisions and weakening trust in institutions. An election period is a natural moment.
State-linked influence networks and pro- Russian hacktivist collectives, mainly DDoS.
No Russian-attributed election activity confirmed in the sources reviewed.
Medium
Hacktivist collectives
Visibility and ideology. Election day is a symbolic target, and some personas front for state operators.
Pro-Iran and pro-Palestinian collectives, pro- Russian collectives and opportunistic DDoS crews.
A government-site target list (9 Oct), a DDoS order against a party site (16 Oct), and 34 DDoS incidents by one group in October.
High
How to read this page Reading the landscape
Many actors, different motives, one date. The most active
actor in the October window (34 incidents) is a DDoS group,
while the most election-specific actor is a state-linked leak
persona.
B O T T O M L I N E
Iran is the actor with an explicit election campaign. Russia is a risk with no confirmed election activity yet. Hacktivists are the volume.
Interest is not capability.
A hacktivist brand does not rule out a state operator.
Treat any persona's claim as intent to verify, not proof of access.
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FORECAST AND SCENARIOS
Likelihood against impact, until election dayLikelihood against impact, until election day
Scenario heat map IMPACT LOW IMPACT MEDIUM IMPACT HIGH
High 2 1
Medium 3 6 4 5
Low 7
Key 1 Nightly hack-and-leak and doxxing 2 DDoS on party, government and results sites 3 Defacement with political messaging 4 Takeover of officials' accounts 5 Leaks of voter or party databases (real or recycled) 6 False or manipulated content 7 Destructive attack
FORECAST LIKELIHOOD CONFIDENCE WHAT IT LOOKS LIKE
DDoS attacks on public websites High 80 Short, high-volume waves, usually announced on Telegram.
Leaks about Members of Knesset and public officials
High 80 Contact details, internal documents and personal data. First leaks observed.
Disruption or takedown of government and municipal websites
Medium 60 Outages or defacement, with the highest risk on election day.
Takeover of official social media accounts Medium 60 Session theft or phishing, used to spread false messages.
False or manipulated content Medium 60 Fake accounts, fabricated leaks, false results and AI- generated media.
Sale of access and extortion Medium 60 Use of the noise to sell access or extort.
Destructive attack Low 60 Wiper malware against higher-value targets.
B O T T O M L I N E
Most scenarios need no advanced capability. They depend on exposed services, weak authentication and public attention.
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THREAT ACTORS
Five kinds of actor, one shared deadline.Five kinds of actor, one shared deadline. Five types of actor are expected to be active around the elections, and Handala is only one of them. They differ in motivation, capability and in how far their public claims can be trusted.
ACTOR TYPE MOTIVATION TYPICAL ACTIVITY EXPECTED ELECTION-PERIOD OUTPUT RELIABILITY OF CLAIMS
State-linked influence persona (Handala)
Political and psychological impact on Israel, in line with Iranian state interests
Phishing, account takeover, hack-and- leak, doxxing, wiper malware
Leaks about officials and organizations, claims of penetration, possible disruptive attack
Medium
Pro-Iran and pro- Palestinian hacktivists
Ideology and visibility
DDoS, defacement, unverified leak claims
DDoS waves against government, health, finance and media sites around the vote
Low to Medium
Pro-Russian and other opportunistic hacktivists
Visibility and alignment against shared adversaries
Mainly DDoS Participation in coordinated campaigns timed to symbolic dates
Low to Medium
Cybercriminals and access brokers
Financial gain Sale of access and data, ransomware, extortion
Use of the surrounding noise to sell access or extort
Medium
Foreign influence networks
Shaping narratives and eroding trust
Fake accounts posing as Israelis, AI- generated content
Deepfakes, false results and manufactured leaks, peaking close to election day
Medium
Handala as an example
The actor most likely to act on the election announcement. The group appeared in late 2023 and is operated by Void Manticore, which
Check Point Research links to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security. Its activity includes phishing and impersonation, theft and
leaking of data, doxxing of government and security personnel, and wiper malware aimed at Windows and Linux systems.
In March 2026 it claimed a destructive attack on a US medical technology company carried out through a cloud device-management
platform, which showed a willingness and capability to move from leaking to destroying. The group is known to describe its access in the
strongest possible terms, which is why claims are graded in this report.
Claims versus capability
Read the intent literally. Verify theRead the intent literally. Verify the capability.capability.
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ATTACK METHODS AND TIMELINE
Simple methods, aimed at a symbolic date.Simple methods, aimed at a symbolic date. METHOD HOW IT APPEARS TYPICAL TARGETS MITRE ATT&CK
Denial of service (DDoS)
Short, high-volume floods against public websites and portals, usually announced on Telegram
Government, municipal, healthcare, finance, media
T1498, T1499
Website defacement or takedown
Replacement of page content with political messaging, or taking public sites offline
Weakly protected public sites, local authorities
T1491
Account takeover Session theft, phishing and reuse of leaked credentials against social media and messaging accounts
Official channels, senior staff T1539, T1566, T1078
Hack-and-leak and doxxing
Publication of internal documents, contact lists and personal data, including on Members of Knesset and public officials
Officials, employees, vendors T1567
Exposed services Use of internet-facing RDP, SMB and unpatched web services to gain access
Any organization with exposed remote access
T1133, T1021.001, T1190
Destructive attacks Wiper malware and abuse of device-management tools Higher-value organizations T1485, T1561
Impersonation and deepfakes
Fake accounts, spoofed executives, false results, manipulated audio or video
Public-facing brands and executives
T1656
Three windows
NOW TO OCTOBER 26 Before election day Reconnaissance and phishing, preparation of fake accounts and lookalike domains, and a steady flow of announced leaks designed to build anticipation.
OCTOBER 27 Election day Highest risk of visible disruption: DDoS against public services, defacement, and false or manipulated content about turnout or results, including AI-generated audio and video.
OCTOBER 28 ONWARD After election day Material taken earlier is often published weeks after the operation. Expect leaks, claims of earlier access and follow-up campaigns.
3.53.5 daysdays
The average gap between new breach claims since the countdown began (15, 18 and 22 October). The cadence shows how a campaign can keep an election in the headlines without a single verified compromise.
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ANALYSIS & RISK ASSESSMENT
Read the intent literally. Verify the capability.Read the intent literally. Verify the capability. Q1 Why does this concern organizations that are not political? Previous hacktivist waves hit government portals, healthcare providers,
manufacturers and online commerce sites alike, because the aim is visibility rather than a specific victim. Organizations are also routes to others, through shared vendors, shared infrastructure and employees whose data can be leaked.
Q2 How should the claims be read? Intent should be taken seriously and capability should be verified. A publication achieves its purpose when it draws public attention, so organizations should prepare for the reputational effect as well as the technical one.
Q3 What is realistic on election day? DDoS is highly likely, together with defacement or takedown of public websites, account takeover and fabricated content. A destructive attack is less likely but cannot be excluded, given Handala's March 2026 record.
Q4 What is being monitored? Check Point's Exposure Management department monitors Telegram channels, underground forums and social media for election-related statements, calls to action and target lists. The Handala statement is the most prominent election-specific declaration identified so far, and leaks about Members of Knesset have begun to appear.
Risk by sector
The overall risk to Israeli organizations during the election period is assessed as High, with a confidence of 80.
SECTOR MOST LIKELY SCENARIO LIKELIHOOD IMPACT CONFIDENCE
Government and municipalities
DDoS, takedown or defacement of websites, and leaks about officials including Members of Knesset
High High 80
Healthcare Leak of employee or patient data and DDoS against public portals
Medium Very high 60
Financial services DDoS and phishing or impersonation of the brand and executives
High Medium 70
Telecom and critical infrastructure
DDoS, service disruption and claims of network access Medium High 60
Technology and service providers
Compromise used as a route to customers, and leaks of customer data
Medium High 60
This assessment reflects the information available to Check Point's Exposure Management department at the time of this review. It does not constitute a guarantee that any specific organization will or will not be targeted, or confirmation of any organization's exposure, which only the organization can verify directly. Final determination, and any decisions taken as a result, remain the responsibility of each organization.
Bottom line
High risk, confidence 80. The preparationHigh risk, confidence 80. The preparation has already begun.has already begun.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
What to do, and when.What to do, and when.
IMMEDIATELY, IN THE COMING DAYS
BEFORE ELECTION DAY
Remove remote access and file-sharing services from direct internet exposure. Services such as RDP (3389), SMB (445) and RPC (135) should be reachable only through a VPN, zero-trust gateway or bastion host with multi-factor authentication, and network- level authentication should be enabled.
Enforce phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication on administrative accounts and official social media accounts. Hardware security keys or passkeys should replace SMS and app-based codes where possible, and active sessions on messaging and social media accounts should be reviewed and ended if unrecognized.
Confirm that DDoS protection is active and tested. Always-on protection, rate limiting and a web application firewall should cover public websites, origin servers should sit behind the protection layer, and a direct contact at the provider should be confirmed.
Publish a list of official communication channels and verify that official accounts are secured. A single page listing official domains and social media accounts helps the public and the media tell real from fake, and speeds up takedown requests.
Agree an escalation channel that works independently of normal infrastructure. Out-of-band contact details and a named decision-maker for election day should be agreed in advance.
Enforce DMARC at a reject policy together with SPF and DKIM. This reduces the use of spoofed sender addresses in election- themed phishing and in executive impersonation.
Act quickly on lookalike domains, fake social media profiles and spoofed executive accounts. Check Point's Exposure Management department monitors for these on behalf of customers, and organizations are recommended to pre-approve takedown actions so that response is not delayed.
Add CAA records and DNSSEC, and lock the domain at the registrar. These steps reduce the risk of fraudulent certificate issuance and DNS hijacking, which are used to redirect users to fake sites.
Review the exposure of employee and executive data. Credentials found in recent leaks should be reset, unnecessary personal information should be removed from public pages, and senior staff should be briefed on doxxing and impersonation risk.
Harden public websites against defacement and disruption. Public information should be served from static or read-only content where possible, file integrity monitoring should be deployed, and an offline copy of key pages should be ready for fast restoration.
Review third-party and supply chain access. Vendors with remote access or hosting responsibilities should be asked to confirm DDoS readiness, contact details and incident procedures for the election period.
Prepare a procedure for suspicious executive requests and false media content. Requests that arrive by voice or video should be verified through a second channel, and a short pre-approved statement should be ready in case false content about the organization appears.
One week left
The first five actions close most of theThe first five actions close most of the exposure.exposure.
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APPENDIX AND METHODOLOGY
Recommendations continued, indicators, andRecommendations continued, indicators, and how the statistics were calculatedhow the statistics were calculated
DURING THE ELECTION PERIOD
AFTER ELECTION DAY
Methodology and notes on the statistics
Appendix: indicators of compromise, for detection and hunting The indicators were drawn from Check Point Research's March 2026 analysis of Handala activity. Infrastructure indicators should be reviewed before blocking, and the absence of a match does not mean the absence of activity.
TYPE INDICATOR CONTEXT
IP address 107.189.19.52 Infrastructure linked to Handala activity
IP address 146.185.219.235 Infrastructure linked to Handala activity
IP address 31.57.35.223 Infrastructure linked to Handala activity
IP address 82.25.35.25 Infrastructure linked to Handala activity
SHA-256 08b80ab6a6c4eca08e18096c9468fe0bd2e33fc23142730e59177e6fcd7c902d File linked to Handala activity
SHA-256 1ab1586975779b7d1ce09315b1312b939a194de6df7c5e92aea4f963835f7b08 File linked to Handala activity
SHA-256 d969ff9fe6099db8f6ef3977a849b1757aa221669387eb29a2c6c0ce4b4abe70 File linked to Handala activity
Increase security monitoring and freeze non-essential changes. Extended SOC coverage, a change freeze on production systems and a tested incident response plan reduce both the likelihood and the duration of disruption.
Maintain isolated backups and a tested recovery plan. Destructive attacks target backups as well, so recovery copies should be kept apart from the production network and restoration should be rehearsed.
Continue to watch for leaks and refresh exposed credentials for several weeks. Check Point's Exposure Management department will continue to monitor for mentions of customer assets and will report findings through the platform.
Sources: the Check Point election monitor (dark web and Telegram), the Check Point intelligence database, the Check Point CTI repository (incidents tagged to Israel), aggregated alert telemetry from 8 Israeli organizations in finance, insurance, the public sector, industry and retail, and the Check Point leaked-credentials database (12 government domains).
Periods: 13 April to 14 May (baseline, 32 days), September (30 or 31 days, depending on the indicator), and 1 to 21 October (21 days). All values are normalized per day.
The election monitor ran from 10 to 30 June and from 4 October. Its comparison is to June.
Mention counts for Handala include several kinds of source. For #OpIsrael the sampled items were Telegram only.
No causal link to the elections is proven. The Tishrei holidays (September to early October) affect activity. "Calm before the storm" is an analyst hypothesis.
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C H E C K P O I N T · E X P O S U R E M A N A G E M E N T
27.10.2026
They announced it.They announced it. Close the gaps before theyClose the gaps before they arrive.arrive. Check Point's Exposure Management department continues to monitor the election-related threat landscape
and will notify customers through the platform if specific targeting of their assets is identified.
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